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In the last decade there has been a lot of attention paid to the way the physical situation of a robot affects its behavior. This paper focuses on one way in which the social situation can effect an agent. It aims to identify phenomena that may be usefully taken to indicate the extent to which agents are inextricably embedded in a society of other such agents. In particular, it aims to show this for a particular artificial simulation involving co-evolving agents. In order to do this, a modeling approach is adopted which takes ideas from several varieties of constructivism.
The first section presents a brief overview of constructivism and its relevance to simulations of social agents. Then there is a section discussing the idea and possible effects of social embeddedness. A computational model illustrating differing degrees of social embeddedness is then exhibited. Some general results and a couple of more detailed case studies are then presented. The paper ends with a short discussion of the possible causes of social embeddedness. 1 CONSTRUCTIVISM AND AI Constructivism, broadly conceived, is the thesis that knowledge can not be a passive reflection of reality, but has to be more of an active construction by an agent. Although this view has its roots in the ideas of Kant, the term was first coined by Piaget (1954) to denote the process whereby an individual constructs its view of the world. Extrapolating from this is Ernst von Glasersfeld's 'radical constructivism' (von Glaserfeld, 1995) which approaches epistemology from the starting point that the only knowledge we can ever have is so constructed. In cybernetics it was used by Heinz Von Foerster (1973) , who pointed out that an organism cannot distinguish between perceptions of the external world and internally generated signals (e.g. hallucinations) on a priori grounds, but retains those constructs that help maintain the coherence of the organism over time (since those that do not will have a tendency to be selected out).
There is not enough room to survey this rich philosophical position. So for the purposes of this paper I will list some the aspects of constructivism that are relevant for my purposes here:' Ĩ models2 that an agent builds do not necessarily reflect the structure of agent's environment (as viewed by an external observer) -rather the models are merely compatible with the environment and the agent's interactions with that environment ; models are developed with respect to the needs and goals of the agent, particularly in respect to its attempts to control its own actions and that of its environment; models are built up as a result of active interaction with its environment rather than as a result of passive observation and reasoning -in fact, the models may well require interaction with the environment in order to function as action selection mechanisms; · it emphasizes the bottom-up approach to modeling, with a tendency away from a priori considerations.
Constructivism has been taken up by some researchers in artificial intelligence and artificial life (e.g. Drescher, 1991; Riegler, 1992; Vaario, 1992) as an approach to building and exploring artificially intelligent agents from the bottom up. Here, instead of specifying an architecture in detail from a priori considerations, the mechanisms and cognition of agents are developed using self-organizational and evolutionary mechanisms as far as possible. For this approach to be viable the agents must be closely situated in its target environment, since it is the serendipitous exploitation of features of its environment and the strong practical interaction during development which makes it effective. This is in contrast to what might be called an 'engineering approach' to artificial agents, where the agents are designed and set-up first and then let loose to interact with other such agents in order to achieve a specified goal. Constructivism in AI can be seen as an approach which subsumes the work of Rodney Brooks ( 1991 ) , but instead of the development of the organism happening through an analysis, design and test cycle done by human designers based on their knowledge, the development is achieved via self-organizational and evolutionary processes acting on an agent situated in its environment. This paper is constructivist in three different ways.
Firstly, the approach to characterizing social embeddedness is through properties of our models of the systems we are investigating, rather than some aspect of an external independent reality, because I claim that a useful characterization of social embeddedness has to take into account the modeling framework.
Secondly, the exhibited model is built in a constructivist AI style, in that the content and development of an agent's cognition is specified as loosely as possible, where the internal models are grounded in their effect upon the agent in conjunction with other agent's actions. The meaning of the agent's communication is not fixed before-hand by the programmer, so the effect of such communication and action is grounded (Harnad, 1990) in its use in practice and in the language-games that the agents appear to play (Wittgenstein, 1953) . · Lastly, constructivism is posited as a sensible explanation of the observed behavior of the agents in the model described and hence, by analogy, as a possible explanation for other social situations.
CHARACTERIZING SOCIAL EMBEDDEDNESS
In attempting to elucidate the concepts of 'social situatedness' or 'social embeddedness', one faces the problem of where to base one's discussion. In sociology it is almost an assumption that the relevant agents are ultimately embedded in their society -phenomena are described at the social level and their impact on individual behavior is sometimes considered. This is epitomized by Durkheim, when he claims that some social phenomena should be considered entirely separately from individual phenomena (Durkheim, 1893) . Cognitive science has the opposite perspective -the individual's behavior and processes are primitive and the social phenomena may emerge as an emergent result of such individuals interacting. This split is mirrored in the world of computational agents. In traditional AI it is the individual agent's mental processes and behavior that are the focus of their models, and this has been extended to considerations of the outcomes when such autonomous agents interact. In Artificial Life and computational organizational theory the system (i.e. as a whole) is the focal point and the parts representing the agents tend to be relatively simple. For this reason I will take a pragmatic approach and suggest the categorization of social systems relative to some pertinent modeling considerations. This is based on a philosophy of pragmatic holism which is constructivist in style. Its essence is that regardless of whether the natural world is theoretically reducible we have to act as if there are irreducible wholes. This means that we should explicitly include aspects of the modeling process in our theories. For more on this position see (Edmonds, forthcoming) . Thus, I wish to step back from the dispute as to the extent to which people (or agents) are socially embedded to one of the appropriateness of different types of models of agents. I want to avoid the idealizations involved in this disputed area and concentrate on what are useful attributions in describing social situations and their computational analogs.
Being Situated
When Brooks ( 1991 ) made his now famous critique of AI (as it was then), he was specifically addressing shortcomings with respect to the problem of getting robots to master a physical environment. This spawned a whole field of research based on the premise that the physical situation was critically important in the design of agents (and in particular robots).
Since then, the property of 'being situated' has been characterized in many (subtly different) ways. For example, Alonso Vera and Herbert Simon (1993) argue that the characteristic of situated action is the utilization of external rather than internal representations via the functional modeling of the affordances provided by the environment. In their account this allows the paring down of the internal representation so that its processing can occur in real-time.
More recently, William Clancey (1997) , in attempting to forge some sort of consensus on the subject wrote: &dquo;In summary, the term situated emphasizes that perceptual-motor feedback mechanisms causally relate animal cognition to the environment and action in a way that a mechanism based on logical (deductive inference alone does not capture&dquo; (p.344).
What these various approach agree upon is that if you are to effectively model certain domains of action over time then you need to include sufficient detail of the environment so that explanations of choice of action can be made in terms of the detailed causal chains in this environment. In other words, the actions will not be satisfactorily explained with reference to internal inference processes alone, but only by including causal feedback from the environment.
This can be summarized (a little crudely) by saying that in a non-situated agent the internal 'inferential'
processes form a sufficient model for the relationship between perception and action (Figure 1 ), whereas when an agent is situated you also need to include the exterior causation ( Figure 2 ). Of course, if the agent was making a one-shot decision the pictures would be equivalent in effect since the causal part of the loop would not be needed to determine the relationship between perception and action. More usually, the loop is traversed many times, with several past actions and perceptions, in order to determine the next action. Being situated has practical considerations for what might be effective decision strategies on behalf of the agent. If internal models alone are likely to be insufficient (or just too difficult), and if there are implicit computational and representational resources in the environment, it make sense to make use of these by 'probing' them frequently for information as to effective action. This fits in with Lucy Suchman's (Suchman, 1987) characterization of situatedness which is as follows: C:.. the contingence of action on a complex world... is no longer treated as an extraneous problem with which the individual actor must contend, but rather is seen as an essential resource that makes knowledge possible and gives action its sense.... the coherence of action is not adequately explained by either preconceived cognitive schema or institutionalized social norms. Rather the organization of situated action is an emergent property of moment-by-moment interactions ... &dquo; (p. 179).
Being Socially Situated
In a physical situation the internal models may be insufficient because of the enormous computation capacity, amount of information, and speed that would be required by an agent attempting to explicitly model its environment. In a social situation, although the speed is not so critical, the complexity of that environment can be overwhelming, and there is also the obvious external computational resources provided by the other agents and their interactions. This means that an agent can be said to be socially situated by analogy with being physically situatedin both cases the balance of advantage lies in using external causal processes and representations rather than internal ones. The fact that the source of this imbalance in each case is due to different causes leads to a different 'flavor' of the situatedness, but there is enough in common to justify the common use of word 'situated.' Of course, social environments vary greatly and the fact of being socially situated will thus be contingent on the particular agent and its social context. The frequent sensing and probing of the physical environment can be translated into 'gossip,' one of the functions of which is the frequent sampling and testing of the social environment. The reliance of external computational resources and models is arguably even more pronounced in social situations than physical ones -social agents may accept the output of external sources (including other agents) as a direct influence on their decision making, e.g., in fashion.
Being Socially Embedded
Extending the above characterizations of situatedness, I want to say that an agent is socially embedded in a collection of other agents to the extent that it is more appropriate to model that agent as part of the total system of agents and their interactions as opposed to modeling it as a single agent that is interacting with an essentially unitary environment. Thus, saying an agent is socially embedded is stronger than saying it is merely socially situated. I have characterized social embeddedness as a construct which depends on one's modeling goals, since these goals will affect the criteria for the appropriateness of models. It can be read as contrasting modeling agent interaction from an internal perspective (the thought processes, beliefs, etc.) with modeling from external vantage (messages, actions, structures etc.). This is illustrated below in Figure 3 . This is not an extreme 'relativist' position since, if one fixes the modeling framework and criteria for model selection, the social embedding of agents within a collection of agents can sometimes be unambiguously assessed. When the modeling framework is agreed, the object of modeling (in this case 'social systems') will constrain the models that fit the framework. If one is extremely careful (and lucky) it might entail a unique modelin such cases we can safely project the social embeddedness upon the social system itself. Note however, that this projective attribution onto the social system is a post-hoc attribution that can only occur unambiguously in special circumstances. Usually there will be many arbitrary choices involved in the modeling of the social phenomena, so that the model (and hence the social embeddedness) is underdetermined by the phenomena itself. It is for this reason that it is more useful to define the social embeddedness with respect to model properties and use the association of the best model (by the chosen model selection criteria) with the phenomena itself as a means of inferring properties on the object system. According to this account the social embedding is dependent on the modeling framework. Such a modeling framework includes the language of model representation, the model selection criteria, and the goals of modeling. Frequently such a framework is implicitly agreed upon, but not always. I have not the space here to fully specify what such a framework entails; for more details on this see (Edmonds, 1997; .
Notice that criteria for model acceptability can include many things other than just its predictive accuracy, for example: complexity (Edmonds, 1997) . It is the inevitability of these other concerns that forces us to relativize this approach as one concerning the appropriateness of our constructs (along with the different modeling goals and frameworks). For example, a computer may be able to find obscure and meaningless models which (for computational purposes) separate out the behavior of a single agent from its society (using something like genetic programming), and which are totally inaccessible to a human intelligence. Also, the modeling framework is indispensable ; for example, an agent may not be at all embedded from an economic perspective but very embedded from the perspective of kinship relations. Let us consider some examples to make this a little clearer.
· Firstly, a neo-classical economic model of interacting agents where each of these agents individually has a negligible effect on its environment, which would mean that a model of the whole system could be easily transformed into one of a representative agent interacting with an economic environment.3 Here one would say that each agent was not socially embedded since there is little need to model the system as a whole in order pudding will ultimately be in the eating; whether this approach helps us obtain useful models of social agents or not.
The idea of social embedding is a special case of embedding in general -the 'social' bit comes from the fact we are dealing with collections of parts that are worthy of being called agents.
Possible Effects of Social Embeddedness on Behavior
If one had a situation where the agents were highly embedded in their society, what noticeable effects might there be (both from a whole systems perspective and from the viewpoint of an individual agent)? The efficacy of being socially embedded from the point of view of the embedded agent is twofold: Firstly, it will be to its advantage (in general) to include individual specific elements in its internal decision making processes, and secondly, a complete model of its environment will be impossible. In general, this may mean that it will be more productive for the agent to cope by constructing behaviors that will allow it to exploit the environment rather than attempting to model its environment explicitly -in other words adopt an instrumentalist approach rather than a realist approach to its models, where these are grounded in possible action4. As a result, the models of an agent may appear somewhat arbitrary (to an external observer trying to interpret them as reflective models of the agent's environment) ; it is worth frequently sampling and interactively testing its social environment to stand instead of complete internal models of that environment (e.g. engage in gossip); agents specialize to inhabit a particular social niche, where some subset of the total behavior is easier to model, predict, and hence exploit; at a higher level, there may be a development of social structures and institutions to 'filter out' some of the external complexity of its social environment and regularize the internal society with rules and structures (Luhman, as summarized in Bednarz, 1984) ; the agent's communications will tend to have their meaning grounded in their use in practice rather than as a reflection of an external social reality (since this inaccessible to the agent). · To summarize, the effect of being socially embedded might be that the agents are forced to construct their social knowledge rather than model that society explicitly.
Checking for Social Embeddedness
Given that the presence of social embeddedness can have practical consequences on the modeled social behavior, then it can be checked for. This is particularly so for a model of artificial agents, because the data is fully available. Given the approach described above to specify the social embeddedness, it is necessary to specify the modeling framework and selection criteria first.
Let us suppose that our criteria for model goodness are complexity and explanatory power. By explanatory power, I mean the extent of the phenomena that the model describes. Thus, there is a familiar trade-off between explanatory power and complexity in our modeling of our simulation . If two descriptions of the simulation are functionally the same, the social embeddedness comes out as a difference between the complexity of the models at the agent and social levels.5 This is not quite the obvious way of going about things -it might seem more natural to fix some criteria for explanatory power and then expand the complexity (in this case by including more aspects of the social nature of the environment in the model) until it suffices. However, in social simulation where it is often unclear what an acceptable standard of explanatory power might be, it is easier to proceed by making judgements as to the complexity of models.
In the model below, I will use a rough measure of the social embeddedness based the computation that takes place to determines an agent's communication and action. This will be indicated by the proportion of subexpressions in their learnt strategies which perform an external reference to the individual actions of other agents to those that perform internal calculations (logical, arithmetic, statistical etc.). This ignores the computation due to the evaluation and production of the expressions inside each agent, but this is fairly constant across runs and agents.
A MODEL OF CO-EVOLVING SOCIAL AGENTS
The model described below is illustrativeit illustrates the possibility of social embedding. Despite the obvious analogies with human social interaction, it does not attempt to be descriptively realistic. Instead it is designed to reveal the sort of phenomena that can emerge in a collection of socially situated agents -ones that co-develop behavioral strategies in an open-ended way, where these strategies can include references to the actions and utterances of specific agents in their society. The choice of the learning algorithm based on genetic programming is so as to bias the agents as little as possible with a priori specifications of the 'desirable' strategy, but to allow the emergence of behaviors from their reaction to the environment and each other. The primitives that determine the range of strategies are designed to be as expressive as possible; thus it allows everything from purely social strategies such as following a leader, to implementations of the sort of randomized mixed strategy that might be suggested by game theory.
The Set-up
The model is based upon Brian Arthur's 'El Farol Bar' model (Arthur, 1994) , but extended in several respects, principally by introducing learning and communication. There is a fixed population of agents (in this case ten). Each week each agent has to decide whether or not to go to El Farol's Bar. Generally, it is advantageous for an agent to go unless it is too crowded, which it is if 67% or more of all the agents go (in this case seven or more). This advantage is expressed as a numeric utility, but this only impacts on the model in the agent's evaluations of their models. Before making their decision agents have a chance to communicate with each other. This model can be seen as an extension of the work in (Akiyama & Kaneko, 1996) , which investigates a three player game.
The environment
There are two alternative schemes for representing the utility gained by agents, which I have called crowdavoiding and friendly. The first of these encourages the straightforward discoordination of the agents' actions, and the second is a mixture of discoordina-tion and cooperation. The contrast between them is designed to bring out the extent to which embedding may be effected by the motivation of the agents. In the crowd-avoiding scheme, each agent gets the most utility for going when less than seven of the other agents go (0.7); they get a fixed utility (0.5) if they do not go; and the lowest utility for going when it is crowded (0.4). In this way there is no fixed reward for any particular action because the utility gained from going depends on whether too many other agents also go. In this way there is also no fixed goal for the agent's learning, but it is relative to the other agents' behavior (which will, of course, change over time). Under this scheme it is in each agent's interest to discoordinate their action with the others (or, at least, a majority of the others).
The friendly scheme is similar to the crowd-avoiding scheme; there is a basic utility of 0.5 for going if it is not crowded, and 0.2 if it is, but if they go to the bar each agent gets a bonus (0.2) for each 'friend' that also goes. If they stay at home they are guaranteed a utility of 0.65, so it is worth going if you go when it is not crowded with at least one other friend or if it is crowded with three or more friends. Who is a friend of whom is decided randomly at the beginning and remains fixed thereafter. Friendship is commutative; that is if A is a friend of B then B is a friend of A. An -/m Figure 4 . An imposed friendship network. example of such a network is illustrated in Figure 4 . The number of friendships and agents is constant across runs but the detailed structure differs. In this scheme it is in the interest of agents to go when their other friends and only their friends are going. Under this scheme it is in each agent's interest to coordinate its actions with its designated friends but to discoordinate its action with the other agents.
Under both schemes it is impossible for all agents to gain the maximum utility; there is always some conflict to provide a potential for continual dynamics.
The agents
Each agent has a population of models composed of (pairs of) expressions that represent possible behaviors in terms of what to say and what to do (its strategies). This population is fixed in size but not in content. These expressions are taken from a strongly typed formal language which is specified by the programmer, but the expression can be of any structure and depth. Each agent does not 'know' the meaning or utility of any expression, communication or action -it can only evaluate each whole expression as to the utility each expression would have resulted in if it had used it in the past to determine whether it would go to the bar or not and the other's behaviors had remained the same. This is the only way in which the utilities affect the course of the model. Each week each agent takes the best such pair of expressions (in terms of its present evaluation against the recent past history) and uses them to determine its communication and action. This means that any particular expression does not have an a priori meaning for that agentany such meaning has to be learned. This is especially so for the expression determining the communication of the agents, which is only implicitly evaluated (and hence selected for) via the effect its communication has on others (and itself).
Each agent has a population of such strategies (in this case 40). This population is very small for a GP algorithm -this is deliberate, so as to limit the explorative power of each agent to a more credible level. This population of expressions is generated according to the specified language at random. In subsequent generations the population of expressions is developed by a genetic programming (Koza, 1992) algorithm with a lot of propagation and only a little cross-over.
That is, 80% of the population in the next week is composed of strategies that are copies of those in the last week, and 20% are formed using the tree crossover operator from pairs of parent strategies. The formal language of these expressions is quite expressive. The primitives allowed are shown in Figure   5 . They include: logical operators, arithmetic, stochastic elements, self-referential operations, listening operations, elements to copy the action of others, statistical summaries of past numbers attending, operations for looking back in time, comparisons, and the quote operator. A brief explanation of their effects during evaluation are listed in Figure 6 Figure 7 . The primitives are typed (Boolean, name or number) so that the algorithm is strictly a strongly-typed genetic program following (Montana, 1995) . week, else say &dquo;[previous [randomGuess] ]&dquo;, and go if barGoer-7 went last week and I did not.
The reasons for adopting this particular structure for agent cognition is basically that it implements a version of rationality that is credible and bounded but also open-ended and has mechanisms for the expression of complex social distinctions and interaction. In these respects it can be seen as a step towards implementing the 'model social agent' described in (Carley & Newell, 1994) . For the purposes of this paper the most important aspects are: that the agent constructs its expressions out of previous expressions; that its space of expressions is open-ended allowing for a wide variety of possibilities to be developed; that it has no chance of finding the optimal expressions; and that it is as free from a priori design restrictions as is practical and compatible with it having a bounded rationality. This agent architecture and the rationale for its structure are described in more detail in (Edmonds & Moss, 1997; Edmonds, 1998b).
Communication and Imitation
Each agent can communicate with any of the others once a week, immediately before they all decide whether to go to the bar or not. The communication is determined by the evaluation of the talk expression and is usually either 'true' or 'false.' The presence of a quoting operator (quote) in the formal language of the talk expression allows subtrees of the talk expression to be the content of the message. If a quote primitive is reached in the evaluation of the talk expression then the contents of the subtree are passed down verbatim rather than evaluated. If a quoted tree is returned as the result of an evaluation of the talk expression then this is the message that is communicated.
The content of the messages can be used by agents by way of the saidBy and saidByLast primitives in the action and talk expressions. If 'listening' is enabled then other agents can use the message in its evaluation of its expressions -if the message is just composed of a Boolean value then the saidBy primitive is just eval-uated as this value, but if it is a more complex expression (as a result of a quote primitive in the sending agents talk expression) then the whole expression will be substituted instead of the saidBy (or saidByLast) primitive and evaluated as such. The agent can use the output of its own messages by use of other primitives (IPredictedLastWeek and ISaidYesterDay).
If 'imitation' is enabled then other agents can introduce any message (which is not a mere Boolean value) into their own (action) gene pool; this would correspond to agents taking the message as a suggestion for an expression to determine their own action.
In subsequent weeks this expression can be crossed with other expressions in its population of strategies. Runs of the model with and without 'listening' enabled are intended to contrast the effect of the communication on the embedding, and runs with and without 'imitation' to investigate the effect of sharing the pool of strategies explicitly. In all runs agents can follow each other's actions by reference (i.e. through the use of wentLastWeek) -this differs from 'imitation' in that no transference of the content of the strategies takes place, only the results.
Runs of the model
Eight runs of the model were made with ten agents in each run, each over 100 iterations. Each agent had a initial population of 40 pairs of expressions generated at random with a depth of five. Four of the runs were done with the friendly scheme of expression evaluation and four with the crowd-avoiding scheme. In each of these clusters of four runs, in two of the runs the evaluation of saidBy and saidByLast primitives was made the same as an evaluation of a randomDecision terminal, regardless of what was actually said by the relevant agent. This had the effect of stopping agents from 'listening' to what each other said. In each pair of runs one run was with the imitation mechanism on, and one was with this mechanism set as off.
In this way the eight runs cover all the combinations of friendly/crowd-avoiding utility schemes; imitation/no imitation; listening and not listening. These possibilities are illustrated in Figure 8 . To ease reference to these runs, I have given each a mnemonicthis is composed of two letters to indicate the utility scheme (ca for 'crowd-avoiding' and~r for 'friendly'), followed by some letters to indicate whether imitation and/or listening were enabled. For example the mnemonic for the 4the run is ca+li, because the crowdavoiding utility scheme was used and both listening and imitation were enabled.
Implementation
The model was implemented in a language called SDML, (strictly declarative modeling language), which has been developed at the Centre for Policy Modeling specifically for social modeling . The SDML code for the model can be found at URL: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/...-bruce/socemb/code.
The Results
The complete output of the eight runs are accessible at URL: http://www.cpm.mmu.ac.uk/...-bruce/socemb/data. However, the reader is warned that following what is happening from these is a far from trivial matter. Below I summarize some of the general behavior to provide a context for the more detailed illustrations of social embeddedness (or lack of it) that follow.
In Figure 9 and Figure 10 the attendance patterns of the agents during the eight runs are displayed. The most obvious feature is the difference between the patterns under the crowd-avoiding and friendly runs; under the crowd-avoiding scheme attendance appears far more stochastic compared to those under the friendly scheme where there is obvious coordination. This is unsurprizing given that the crowd-avoiding utility scheme encourages the competitive discoordination of behavior whilst there is a considerable advantage to (at least somewhat) coordinating action with one's 'friends' under the friendly scheme. agents (i.e. there is a differentiation of strategies), imitation encourages a similarity of behavior between agents (apparent in the vertical stripes in the ca+i run and the uniformity of the~'r+i run).
In Table 1 and Table 2 , the average utility gained over the last 30 weeks and over all agents is shown for Figure 9 . Attendances for the four runs under the crowd-avoiding scheme (grey=went, black=stayed at home).
The first run exhibits the least regularity -it looks like the output from a stochastic process. 6 It appears that while listening and the friendly utility scheme encourage the emergence of heterogeneity among each run of the simulation. The utility gained under the crowd-avoiding and friendly schemes cannot be directly compared. Under the crowd-avoiding scheme ( Table 1 ) the only significant difference (at the 5% Figure 10 . Attendances for the four runs under the friendly scheme (grey=went, black=stayed at home). level) is between the ca and ca+li runs. In the runs using the friendly scheme ( Table 2 ) the only significant difference (this time at the 1% level) is between the fr+i run and the others.
The next Figures (Figures: 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15) , show examples of the specific causation between the talk and action expressions of the ten agents. To keep the diagrams manageable, I have limited these to the last three weeks of each run of the simulation. These Figures only show the causation due to the saidBy, saidByLast and wentLastWeek primitives that are active (where by 'active' I mean a saidBy or saidByLast primitive in a simulation where listening is enabled and where it isn't logically redundant). So they do not show any causation via attendance statistics (e.g. averageOverLast, num~XlentLast), or the self-referential primitives (e.g.
ISaidYesterday,
IPredictedLastWeek and IWentLast~XTeek) since I wish to focus on the embedding, and these are not so relevant to this concern. In these Figures there is a small box for the talk and action expression of each agent (numbered upwards from 1 to 10)so, for example, that the topmost box under the '1B label represents the action strategy of barGoer-10. Thus, for Figure 12 The numbers in the boxes are the total number of backward causal lines connected to that box if one followed the causation backward (restricted to the last three weeks only). This number is thus an indication of how socially embedded the agent is at any point in timea larger number indicates that there is quite a complex causal chain determining the action (or communication) of that agent, passing through many other agents. A detailed example of this (barGoer-6 at the end of the ca+l run) is analysed in greater detail below.
The crowd-avoiding run with listening only enabled (ca+~ in Figure 12 exhibited the greatest level of causal complexity, but this was very uneven. The causal structure of the talk strategies were fairly simple while the barGoer-6 and barGoer-8's action strategies were determined by a complex web of causes. The crowd-avoiding run with listening and imitation enabled (ca+li) in Figure 13 showed a more even spread with more complexity in the talk expressions determinants. The contrast may be a result of the fact that runs of this model with the (ca+l) set-up show an inherent tendency towards heterogeneity in terms of the style of strategies developed (Edmonds, 1998a) and the social imitation mechanism promotes homogeneity. The other runs illustrated (Figures 11, 14 and 15) show markedly less complexity, with thẽ 'r+z~ exhibiting the least. To enable a comparison of the general levels of embedding I have tabulated the average of the last two weeks of the total of these indicators over all the agents. These numbers are shown in Table 3 and Table   3 .3.1 BarGoer-6 at week 100 of the run with the crowd-avoiding scheme and listening only (ca+1) This case is intended to illustrate the possibility of social embedding in detail. To give a flavor of how complex a detailed explanation of behavior can get I will follow back the chain of causation for the action of barGoer-6 at week 100. I will not give an explanation of these expressions -this would be extremely lengthy, not very illuminating and superfluous to my purpose. The point is that the explicit and detailed mechanisms that determined the action of barGoer-6 4. These are indicative only -they merely suggest that the crowd-avoiding runs of the simulation with listening enabled are more embedded that any of the other runs, with the crowd-avoiding run with listening only enabled, the most. In order to check these, a more detailed study of the causation involved is required.
More Detailed Case Studies
The above analysis of results is only suggestive as to the presence of embedding. So in order to illustrate social embedding (or the lack of it) in these simulations, I analyze a couple of detailed case studies of agents' behavior and the causes one can attribute to it. The first example is a candidate for a socially embedded agent, and the second is an example where despite the appearance of a complex web of causation there is a simple behavioral model, and hence this is not a candidate for social embedding. at week 100 were highly contingent upon the actions and messages of several other agents at several previous dates and contingent in a highly complex way. If I could explain these expressions simply my point would be invalid! At week 100, barGoer-6's action expression was: substituting the talk expressions from bar goers 3 and 4 in week 100 gives: substituting the action expressions from bar goers 3, 4 and 7 in week 99 gives:
Substituting the talk expressions from barGoer-3 in week 99 gives: True.
Even though the above trace is complex, it still ignores several important causal factors: it does not show the evolutionary processes that produce the action and talk genes for each agent at each week; it does not show the interplay of the agent's actions and communications upon events and hence the evaluation of expressions (and hence which is chosen next by all agents); and in simplifying the expressions at each stage I have tacitly ignored the potential effects of the parts of the expressions that are logically redundant under this particular train of events. Even given these caveats the action of barGoer-6 at week 100 was determined by a total of 11 expressions: its choice of the action expression shown; the talk expressions from bar goers 3 and 4 in week 100; the action expressions from bar goers 3, 4 and 7 in week 99; the talk expressions from barGoer-3 in week 99; the action expressions from bar goers 7 an 9 in week 98; and the talk expressions from bar goers 2 and 6 in week 98! On the other hand it is difficult to find models of the behavior of barGoer-6 which do not involve the complex web of causation that occurs between the agents. It is not simplistically dependent on other particular agents (with or without different time lags) but on the other hand is not merely random. This agent epitomizes, in a reasonably demonstrable way, social embeddedness.
3.3.2 BarGoer-9 at the end of the run with the friendly scheme and listening only (fr+1) In contrast to the above case-study, this example is designed to illustrate the possibility that an agent's behavior may appear to be embedded in a complex web of social causation but that there still may be a simple explanation of its behavior. In this case one would not say that the agent is socially embedded if one's modeling framework allowed this simpler model. Here one could say that the detailed web of causation only implemented the simpler strategy. Thus this example illustrates the importance of relativizing the concept of social embedding to the modeling framework.
At week 100 the selected talk and action expressions for the ten agents were as below (I include them for completeness, there is no need to decode these in detail).
Although many of these are simply reducible to True or False, others are not. I have indicated those that do not reduce to True of False by listing them in bold. Furthermore, although many of these expressions remained pretty much constant over the last ten weeks of the simulation, some did not. For example, the chosen action expressions of barGoer-9 during the last ten weeks were highly variable. I show them below. As above, I do not expect the reader to decode them explicitly but merely notice the ways in which there is both variation and commonality between them. , Each time barGoer-9's action expression is a conjunction of saidBy or wentLastWeek primitives referring to agents barGoer-1 and barGoer-7. Each time [wentLastWeek l'barGoer-1 ']] and [saidBy ] in the chosen conjunction. But in this run of the simulation there is a far simpler explanation for bar-Goer-9's behavior: That is because it has only two 'friends' (barGoer-10 and barGoer-3) it is not worth its while to attend. In fact this is true for each agent -its attendance pattern can be explained almost entirely on the number of friends it has (Figure 4 shows the imposed friendship structure for this run). This is shown in Table 5 . Only bar goers 3, 8, and 7 need further explanation. BarGoer-7 has three friends but none of these are 'loners' like barGoer-9 (i.e. only having 2 friends), so there is a good chance that three of its friends will go while barGoer-3 and 8 both have a friend who is a loner.
The behavior with period 6 probably arises due to the fact that agents evaluate their strategies over the arises Table 5 . Number of friends, number of friends who are loners and attendance for last 30 weeks of simulation under the friendly scheme with listening only (fr+1). because agents evaluate their expressions only up to a horizon of five time periods into the past.8
Thus in this case we have a simple explanation of barGoer-9's continued absence from the bar in terms of its own likely utility due to the limited number of friends it has.9 The friendship structure in this run was the one illustrated in Figure 4 . Agents barGoer-3 and 8 are more embedded than the others at the end of this run as the explanation of their behavior has to include each other and the fact that they have friends who only have two friends.
Comments
The runs of the simulation that showed a high degree of social embeddedness exhibit most of the predicted effects which were listed (in the section previous to the description of the model set-up). This is, of course, unsurprizing since I have been using the model to hone my intuitions on the topic; my ideas about social embeddedness and the model have themselves co-developed. In particular: * the expressions that the agents develop strategies that are opportunistic -they do not reflect their social reality but rather constitute it as its causal mechanisms;
* the strategies can appear somewhat arbitrary -it can take a great deal of work to unravel them if one attempts to explicitly trace the complex networks of causation (see the examples in the case studies above); * the agents frequently do incorporate information about the communication and actions of other individual agents instead of attempting to predict their environment using global models -this is partly confirmed by a general analysis of the general distribution of primitive types in the expressions chosen and developed by agents in Figure   16 . Here we can see that the primitives for concerning others' actions and utterances are heavily selected for, while those involving global statistics, random elements, or backward looking primitives are selected against; * the agents specialize as they co-develop their strategies; that is their populations of strategies diverge from each other's to occupy different regions of the total space of possible strategiesthis is not so apparent from the above but is examined in greater depth elsewhere (Edmonds, 1998a) . Figure 16 . Distribution of the relative proportions of some primitive types in the run using the crowd-avoiding scheme with only listening enabled (ca+1). It is unclear whether there was anything that might correspond to the emergence of social structures, but I would expect that such would only result from longer and more sophisticated simulations than the above.
CONDITIONS FOR THE OCCURRENCE OF SOCIAL EMBEDDING
What might enable the emergence of social embeddedness ? At this point one can only speculate, but some factors are suggested by the above model. They might be: * the ability of agents significantly to effect their environmentso that they are not limited to an essentially passive predictive roleonly believing one can effect their environment is not enough, someone who is deluded into thinking they have paranormal effects on their society might not be embedded in that society; * the co-development of the agents -for example, if agents had co-evolved during a substantial part of the development of their genes then maybe this evolution would have taken advantage of the behavior of the other agents; this would be analogous to the way different mechanisms in one organism develop so that they have multiple and overlapping functions that defy their strict separation (Wimsatt, 1972) ; * the existence of exploitable computational resources in the environment (in particular, the society)so that it would be in the interest of agents to use these resources as opposed to performing the inferences and modeling themselves; * the possibility of open-ended modeling by agents, i.e. that there is no practical limit to the variety or complexity of such models -if the space of possible models was essentially small (so that an approximation to a global search could be performed), then the optimal model of the society that the agent inhabited would be feasible for it; * · mechanisms for social distinction (e.g. a naming mechanism) and hence the ability to develop the selective modeling of information sources, which depends on there being a real variety of distinguishable sources to select from; 10 * the ability to frequently sample and probe social information (i.e. gossip), so that individual intelligence might both have enabled the development of social embedding as well as being selected for it (as in the 'social intelligence hypothesis' discussed in Kummer et al, 1997) .
What is unclear from the above model and analysis is the role that imitation plays in the development (or suppression) of social embeddedness, particularly where both imitation and conversational communication are present. Kerstin Dautenhahn (1997) suggests that imitation may have a role in the ability of an agent to cope with a complex social situation (or rather not cope as a result of autism). The above model suggests that sometimes, imitation may have a role in simplifying social situations so that such embedding does not occur.
CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that I have characterized social embedding in a constructivist way, its presence can have real consequences for any meaningful models of social agents that we create. It is not simplistically linked to coordination, communication, or motivation but may interact with these.
Its application may have the most immediate impact upon our modeling methodology. For example, it may help to distinguish which of several modeling methodologies are most useful for specified goals. It might be applied to the engineering of agent communities so as to help reduce unforeseen outcomes by suppressing social embedding. Hopefully, social embeddedness can be identified and analysed in a greater variety of contexts so as to present a clearer picture of its place in the modeling of social agents. NOTES 1 For those who want to know more about the wider framework that is constructivism, a good introduction from a philosophical and cybernetic perspective can be found at the Principia Cybernetica web site at URL: http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/construc.html 4 This may be moderated by the riskiness of the actions involved.
5 One might think from this that social embeddedness might be defined in terms of complexity and hence avoid the constructivist approach, but I would argue that complexity is a similar construct (Edmonds, 1997) .
6 It may rather be the result of some sort of globally coupled chaos, as discussed in (Kaneko, 1990) .
7 The reason for this is that the former group implement global modeling strategies and the second internal, self-referential strategies. Neither of these involve the inclusion of other specific agents' actions or utterances.
8 It is noticeable that in the earlier part of this run these two agents had broadly complementary patterns of attendance, which is understandable due to the friendship structure.
9 Contributions towards the Society for the Abolition of Agent Depression should be sent via the author.
10 This is similar to a remark in (Akiyama & Kaneko, 1996) .
